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The recent trend for acquiring big data assumes that possessing quantitatively more and quali-
tatively finer data necessarily provides an advantage that may be critical in competitive situations.
Using a model complex adaptive system where agents compete for a limited resource using informa-
tion coarse-grained to different levels, we show that agents having access to more and better data
can perform worse than others in certain situations. The relation between information asymmetry
and individual payoffs is seen to be complex, depending on the composition of the population of
competing agents.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le,87.23.Ge,89.75.-k
Agents in a population often coordinate their actions
with that of their neighbors resulting in striking forms,
such as in swarming and flocking [1, 2]. Typically, in
such cases, individuals use information obtained from
their local environment to adjust their actions in order to
achieve some desired objective [3–6]. Emergent coordina-
tion is therefore crucially dependent on the information
acquired by an agent and its ability to process it ap-
propriately, which determines its future course of action.
Often the objectives of different agents in a system may
not be compatible with each other, for instance when
they are competing for a limited resource. Examples of
such situations are abundant in nature, where individu-
als vie for food, shelter and mating opportunities. Even
in our more complex social environment, we regularly
come across instances of such competition, e.g., people
trying to choose the least congested route through an
urban road network or anticipating whether the relative
demand for a financial asset will increase, so as to profit
by buying or selling it at the present [7]. In these set-
tings, individuals may use strategies which project infor-
mation about past experiences to make decisions about
the future course of action [8–10]. Conventional wisdom
suggests that the relative success of an agent in meeting
its objective (i.e., gaining access to the scarce resource)
would increase with the quality and quantity of available
data that would form the basis for its decisions. Indeed
the recent excitement about “big data” is partially based
on the premise that access to more and better informa-
tion provides a competitive advantage [11].
In this paper we show that agents using quantitatively
more data that is also finely resolved (and hence also
qualitatively superior) may not actually do better - and
can in fact lead to significantly worse payoffs - in situa-
tions where they are competing with agents that have ac-
cess to less, as well as more coarse-grained, information.
This surprising result arises from emergent coordination
in the collective activity of agents who use information of
a particular quality (i.e., level of coarse-graining) leading
to macroscopic patterns of behavior that may be dis-
cernible from the data only at a different level of coarse-
graining. Thus, if there are other agents in the popu-
lation who have access to information about the system
at this latter coarse-grained level, they can potentially
exploit this predictability to their advantage. We show
this using a model of preferential access to a limited re-
source. This comprises a complex adaptive system of
agents, each attempting to maximize their payoffs. The
agents are distinguished in terms of the quality and quan-
tity of information that they use to choose between sev-
eral possible options. The setting allows us to vary the
composition of the population in terms of the different
types of agents, each of whom exclusively uses one of two
types of historical data about the system that represent
the two extremes of coarse-graining. We show that the
relation between information asymmetry and the perfor-
mance of agents is a complex one, depending on the rel-
ative fraction of the population that each type of agents
constitute. Thus, the utility of “big-data” is contingent
upon the precise nature of the ecosystem comprising all
its competitors that an agent is located in. The premise
that more and better information will automatically re-
sult in better performance, e.g., by improving predictive
power, therefore needs to be treated with caution. This
is especially true for competitive situations where adap-
tation through learning is involved that are ubiquitous in
systems around us, such as financial markets [12, 13].
To investigate how information asymmetry between
agents affect their performance, specifically when differ-
ent agents use information at diverse levels of coarse-
graining, we focus on a complex adaptive system where
agents compete for a limited resource. Here the heteroge-
neous agents use the different types of information that
they have access to for the same purpose, viz., to have
preferential access to the resource. In particular, we use
the paradigm of the Minority Game (MG) [14–16] which
has all the ingredients to address the above question in
a quantitative manner. In addition, it has the advan-
2tage that the classical version, in which agents use infor-
mation only at a single level of coarse-graining, is well-
understood and can be used as a benchmark for the more
complex situation that is investigated here. We consider
a population of an odd number N of agents who indepen-
dently and simultaneously choose between two options (A
and B, say) in each round. The option that is chosen by
fewer agents is considered the better choice (outcome) in
each round and leads to a higher payoff (say, 1), while
those who had chosen the alternative receive a lower pay-
off (say, 0).
We assume that the population consists of different
types of agents distinguished in terms of the data that
they have access to, which is coarse-grained to different
levels (Fig. 1). The level of coarse-graining k (2 ≤ k ≤
N + 1) is defined in terms of the extent to which an
agent can resolve the number of agents (NA, say) opting
for a particular choice (A). For example, an agent with
k = 2, the coarsest level of resolution, can only distin-
guish between NA > N/2 and NA < N/2 (i.e., whether
A was chosen by the majority or not) in a particular
round [14]. Conversely, the finest level of resolution cor-
responds to k = N + 1, for which an agent can deter-
mine the exact number of agents NA opting for A in a
round [17]. Any value of k between these two extremes
represents intermediate levels of coarse-graining where
the agent can only distinguish whether, in each round,
NA belongs to any one of the intervals [iN/k, (i+1)N/k]
where i = 0, . . . , k − 1. The agents of each type use
the appropriately coarse-grained data to determine their
choice of action in the next round. For clarity we focus
on the interaction between only two types of agents cor-
responding to the extremes of coarse-graining, viz., k = 2
(which we designate as Type 1 agents) and k = N + 1
(Type 2 agents). The memory length of each type of
agent indicates the number of past rounds whose infor-
mation they retain, and is denoted bym1 (m2) for Type 1
(Type 2) agent. Each agent uses strategies that map the
information about past events (m1 bits for Type 1 agent,
m2 log2(N + 1) bits for Type 2 agent) to the choice of
action in the next round (i.e., A or B). Each agent ini-
tially chooses at random a small sample of strategies (e.g.,
of size 2 as here) from the set of all possible strategies,
which is of size 22
m1
for a Type 1 agent and 2(N+1)
m2
for a Type 2 agent. At each round, an agent scores the
strategies according to the potential payoffs that would
have been obtained by using them in the previous rounds
(feedback), and uses the one having the highest score.
In order to study how the relative performance of
agents in choosing their optimal future action is affected
when different agents have access to data with different
levels of coarse-graining (and therefore, qualitatively dis-
tinct information), we first focus on the simplest case of a
single Type 1 agent with memory length m1 interacting
with a population of N − 1 Type 2 agents with mem-
ory length m2. Note that both types of agents use the
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Figure 1: A schematic representation of a complex adaptive
system comprising N agents that are competing for a limited
resource. Every agent has to choose between two possible ac-
tions (A or B) at each round, with the option chosen by the
lesser number of agents being the better choice (outcome) in
that round. The agents decide on their choice using strategies
based on information about the previous m rounds’ collective
choice dynamics, which could result in the system being in one
of k possible states (2 ≤ k ≤ N +1, depending on the level of
coarse-graining) at each round. Here agents have been distin-
guished into two classes (Types 1 and 2) according to the two
extreme levels of coarse-grained information, i.e., k = 2 and
k = N + 1, respectively, that they have access to. After each
round t, the detailed information about the total number of
agents choosing a specific action A (say), NAt , that is accessed
only by Type 2 agents, as well as, binary information, viz.,
the choice of the minority (A or B) which is accessed only
by Type 1 agents, are added to the history of outcomes. The
information about the outcome is also used as feedback for
adaptive selection of strategies by the agents.
different information available to them (representing the
two extremes of coarse-graining) with the identical aim
of predicting the outcome in the next round. One may
naively expect that agent(s) having more information at
their disposal (e.g., as measured in units of bits) will
have an advantage over the other type of agents. Con-
sequently, it would have been expected that when the
number of bits, m1, in the information accessible to the
Type 1 agents is less thanm2log2(N+1), the correspond-
ing quantity for the Type 2 agents, then the latter would
have obtained a relatively higher payoff. This would also
be in accordance with the intuitive notion that the highly
resolved detailed data of Type 2 agents is qualitatively
better than the low-resolution outcome data of Type 1
agents. However, the mean payoffs of the two types of
agents shown in Fig. 2 for different memory lengths m1
and population sizes N reveals that the actual behavior
is more complex.
The most surprising outcome for the case when the
Type 2 agents have memory length m2 = 1 (Fig. 2) is
that the Type 1 agent is able to acquire a relatively higher
payoff at low values of m1 even though the information
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Figure 2: Average payoffs P1, P2 of Type 1 and Type 2 agents
(respectively) shown as a function of the memory length m1
of a single Type 1 agent interacting with N−1 Type 2 agents
with memory length m2 = 1 for different population sizes N .
Note that when the lone Type 1 agent has a lower memory
length m1, it has a relative advantage over Type 2 agents, re-
ceiving the highest payoff when m1 = 2. Payoffs are averaged
over 104 iterations in the steady state and over 100 different
realizations.
accessible to it is highly coarse-grained and quantitatively
much less (in terms of bits) compared to the rest of the
population. Moreover, the range of m1 over which the
Type 1 agent does better than Type 2 agents is seen to
increase with N . Thus, the success of an agent in a com-
plex adaptive system, where the information accessible
by the individual entities differ both in terms of quality
and quantity, is not entirely determined by the amount
and resolution of the data at its disposal. Instead, as we
show below, it depends more on whether discernible pat-
terns in the behavior of the population are present at the
level of coarse-graining it has access to. When the mem-
ory length of the Type 2 agents is increased to m2 = 2
(see Supplementary Information), the Type 1 agent is no
longer observed to have a higher payoff than the rest of
the population, regardless of its memory lengthm1. Note
that Type 2 agents attain the highest degree of emergent
coordination among themselves for m2 = 2 independent
of N [17]. Thus, it is not surprising that the lone Type 1
agent will not be able to outperform the optimally coordi-
nated population of Type 2 agents. However, as we shall
show below, introducing multiple Type 1 agents makes it
possible for these mutually competing individuals to de-
velop emergent coordination within themselves by which
they can outperform Type 2 agents with m2 = 2. If
m2 > 2, the behavior of the Type 2 agents is indistin-
guishable from agents randomly choosing between A and
B [17]. As there is no predictability in the time-series
available to the Type 1 agent that it can exploit, it will
on average receive essentially the same payoff as the rest
of the population.
The opposite case of a single Type 2 agent interacting
with a population of N − 1 Type 1 agents shows that
the lone Type 2 agent will perform better than the rest
of the population when m1 is low, independent of m2
(see Supplementary Information). This can be explained
from the observation that at low m1, the behavior of a
population of Type 1 agents has a periodic pattern in the
number choosing a specific option - which is precisely
the information accessible by the Type 2 agent. It is
therefore optimally placed to exploit the predictability
to its advantage.
To explain the relative performance of different types
of agents having access to information at the two ex-
treme levels of coarse-graining, we focus on the infor-
mation content in the history of outcomes that can be
exploited by the agents to their advantage. As we shall
see, the collective action of any one type of agents may
result in predictable patterns at the other level of coarse-
graining and hence observable only to these other agents.
This “useful” information content above the noise level
can be quantified by measuring the predictability of a
particular choice (say A) being the outcome in a par-
ticular round, given the history of past outcomes. This
history can be either the binary sequence of outcomes
A,B or the detailed time-series of the number of agents
{NAt } choosing a particular option A, the former (lat-
ter) being accessible only to a Type 1 (Type 2) agent.
We can therefore define two distinct information mea-
sures, viz., H1 =
∑
uL
bin
P (uLbin)[P (A|uLbin) − (1/2)]
2,
and H2 =
∑
uL
det
P (uLdet)[P (A|uLdet) − (1/2)]
2. Here,
uLbin is the binary sequence of outcomes for the previ-
ous Lbin rounds while uLdet is the sequence of integers,
each lying between 0 and N , representing the number
of agents choosing A in the previous Ldet rounds. The
probability with which a particular sequence of L suc-
cessive outcomes is observed is denoted as P (uL), while
P (A|uL) represents the conditional probability that the
outcome A follows the sequence uL.
We first consider the case of a population comprising
only Type 2 agents having memory length m2. The col-
lective behavior of such agents generates a history of bi-
nary outcomes whose information content H1 is shown
in Fig. 3 (a) for m2 = 1 and 2. Note that this infor-
mation cannot be used by the Type 2 agents themselves,
whose strategies are based on uLdet but is accessible in
principle to a hypothetical Type 1 agent whose strate-
gies use uLbin . We observe that H1 increases with the
length of the binary sequence, Lbin, over the range of se-
quence lengths considered here, with H1 = 0 when the
history is restricted to the immediately preceding round,
i.e., Lbin = 1. Thus, if a Type 1 agent with memory
length m1 is introduced into this population, it can make
use of the predictability present in the binary sequence
accessible to it when m1 > 1. As m1 increases, the num-
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Figure 3: (a) Information content H1 of the binary sequence
containing the history of outcomes for a game involving only
Type 2 agents shown as a function of the sequence length Lbin.
(b) Information content of the binary sequence, H1, and that
of the time series containing detailed information (exact num-
ber opting for a particular choice) of sequence length Ldet = 1,
H2, for a game involving only Type 1 agents, shown as a func-
tion of the memory length m1 of the agents. The number of
agents considered in both (a) and (b) is N = 255. Results
shown are averaged over 100 realizations.
ber of possible strategies that can be used by the Type
1 agent increases exponentially (= 22
m1
). It therefore
becomes progressively less likely that the agent will ran-
domly pick the strategy that can optimally exploit the
predictability present in uLbin . This implies that the
highest payoff of Type 1 agent is achieved for the low-
est value of m1 having non-zero information content, i.e.,
m1 = 2, as is indeed confirmed by Fig 2.
We next consider the other extreme case represented
by a population comprising only Type 1 agents having
memory length m1. This situation has been studied ear-
lier in the context of understanding how the collective
behavior of such agents undergoes a phase transition as
m1 is varied [18, 19], where the focus is on the information
content H1 of the binary sequence of outcomes available
to these agents [19–22]. Here our focus is instead on the
information content H2 of the detailed time-series uLdet
recording the number of agents choosing a particular op-
tion (shown in Fig. 3 (b) for Ldet = 1). It is important
to note that the latter information cannot be used by
the Type 1 agents whose interactions produce it, as their
strategies are based on uLbin . However, it is accessible to
a hypothetical Type 2 agent with an appropriate memory
length, viz., m2 = Ldet. We observe that H2 is non-zero
even when H1 = 0 at low values of the memory length
m1. This indicates that the detailed history uLdet con-
tains potential predictability that can be exploited by a
Type 2 agent. Thus, both cases of homogeneous agent
type populations considered above demonstrates that the
collective behavior of agents having access to information
coarse-grained at a specific level can give rise to some
amount of predictability that can be perceived only in
the information available at a different level of coarse-
graining.
The above arguments explain the performance of a
single agent of one type interacting with a population
consisting exclusively of agents of the other type. How-
ever, in reality, the number of each type of agents having
access to data at different levels of coarse-graining can
be arbitrary. We shall now, therefore, consider the sit-
uation where the relative fraction of the two types of
agents present in the population is varied between the
two extreme cases considered earlier. The important ef-
fect of introducing more than one agent of a specific type
into the population is that effective coordination between
these agents can emerge, resulting in enhanced payoffs for
them.
We gradually vary the fraction f1 of Type 1 agents in
a population of total size N comprising agents of both
Types 1 and 2. Fig. 4 shows the average payoffs P1, P2
for agents of each type respectively, for different values
of f1 and memory length m1 of Type 1 agents, keeping
the memory length of Type 2 agents fixed [viz., m2 = 1
(a) and = 2 (b)]. As shown earlier for the case of a sin-
gle Type 1 agent in a population of Type 2 agents, here
also we see that Type 1 agents can outperform Type 2
agents even when the quantity of information (measured
in bits) available to the former is much less than that for
the latter. This is particularly striking when the memory
length m1 of Type 1 agents is low, i.e., information con-
tent of each is m1 bits ≪ m2log2(N + 1) bits, which is
the information content of a Type 2 agent. Fig. 4 shows
that, in this low m1 regime, Type 1 agents when present
in small numbers (i.e., low f1) can receive higher payoffs
than the Type 2 agents who form the bulk of the popula-
tion. We expect the situation that we considered earlier,
viz., a single Type 1 agent playing against N − 1 Type 2
agents, to occur when f1 → 0. Thus, we expect the Type
1 agent to achieve best performance (i.e., maximum pay-
off) for a memory size m∗1 = 2 which is indeed observed.
On the other hand, as f1 → 1 the setting is that of a
conventional MG between Type 1 agents where the max-
imum payoff occurs for m∗1 ≃ log2(0.337N) [19] which is
also seen. Indeed, for any fraction 0 < f1 < 1 of Type 1
agents, their best performance is achieved for a memory
size m∗1 that lies between 2 and log2(0.337N) [indicated
by the broken curves in Fig. 4]. Thus, having multiple
Type 1 agents in the population can help them achieve a
higher payoff than they are capable of by playing singly
against a population of Type 2 agents, suggesting an im-
portant role of emergent coordination among a group of
competing agents who are distinguished by the nature of
information available to them.
A simple qualitative argument for this locus of maxi-
mum payoffs for Type 1 agents in the (m1, f1) parameter
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Figure 4: The average payoffs P1, P2 of Type 1 (shown in
blue) and Type 2 agents (red) comprising a population of size
N(= 255) for different population fractions f1 and memory
length m1 of the Type 1 agents. The memory length of the
Type 2 agents are fixed at m2 [= 1 for (a) and = 2 for (b)].
The contours separate the regions in the (m1, f1) parameter
space where Type 1 agents have a relative advantage over
Type 2 agents and vice versa. The broken curve represents the
optimal population fraction f∗1 of Type 1 agents with a given
memory length m1 at which they receive the highest payoff.
The dotted curve is the value of m1 at which Nf1 Type 1
agents are expected to have maximum payoff in absence of
any Type 2 agents. Payoffs are averaged over 104 iterations
in the steady state and over 100 different realizations.
space is as follows. Ignoring for a moment the presence
of Type 2 agents, we can consider the population to ex-
clusively comprise f1N Type 1 agents with memory size
m1. This population will achieve their highest payoff at
m1 ≈ log2(0.337Nf1) [for f1 > 3/N , so that m1 > 0]
shown by the dotted curves in Fig. 4. The presence
of Type 2 agents results in a shift towards lower values
of the optimal population fraction f∗1 of Type 1 agents
(as shown by the empirically obtained curves of maxi-
mum payoff of Type 1 agents represented by the broken
curves). Note that this argument does not say anything
about the relative performance of the two types of agents.
The relatively higher payoff of Type 1 agent (with low
m1) compared to Type 2 agents, despite the latter having
quantitatively more information for decision-making, is
thus an extremely surprising outcome that emerges from
the collective dynamics of interactions between agents
with access to information coarse-grained at different lev-
els.
Let us now consider the performance of the Type 2
agents. When playing against Type 1 agents with low
memory length m1, Type 2 agents achieve their highest
payoff when f1 → 1, i.e., when they are present in ex-
tremely small numbers in the population. In other words,
to achieve the best performance out of availability of de-
tailed data, it is important to have the size of the group
to which this data is available as small as possible in
this regime of low m1. As more agents have access to
this data (i.e., decreasing f1), their payoff is eroded until
they actually perform worse than those having coarser-
grained data, i.e., Type 1 agents. Thus, access to more
and better data is not by itself a determining factor for
success in a complex adaptive situation.
As the memory length m1 of the Type 1 agents in-
creases, the optimal population fraction at which Type
2 agents achieve the highest payoff decreases from the
neighborhood of f1 = 1. In fact, in the case of Type 2
agents having memory length m2 = 2 (the optimal mem-
ory length for a population exclusively composed of such
agents), their best performance is achieved as f1 → 0.
Thus, in this high m1 regime (m1 ≥ 6 for the case of
m2 = 2), Type 2 agents achieve high payoffs by dominat-
ing the population. By contrast, Type 1 agents do better
than Type 2 agents for large f1 as a result of emergent
coordination within their group. Indeed, in this regime,
for any given m1 the payoff of Type 1 agents increases
with f1. Thus, the outcome is not symmetric for agents
having access to information at the two extreme levels
of coarse-graining. Note that as m1 is increased more
and more, the strategy space for Type 1 agents become
so large that the action of the agents essentially resemble
randomly choosing between the two options. Ifm2 is also
sufficiently large (> 2), both types of agents achieve sim-
ilar payoffs, equal to that obtained by a random choice
strategy (see Supplementary Information).
To conclude, we have shown that information asym-
metry among agents in a complex adaptive system can
have surprising consequences. Specifically, in a system
where agents compete for a limited resource using strate-
gies based on information about the collective behavior
in previous interactions, asymmetry arising from indi-
viduals having access only to data coarse-grained to dif-
ferent levels can result in agents with more and better
data performing worse than others under certain circum-
stances. Such counter-intuitive effects arise from pre-
dictable patterns emerging in the collective information
about the system at a certain level of coarse-graining and
thus discernible only to agents privy to that level. This
provides them a competitive advantage when the pop-
6ulation is dominated by agents of a different type who
do not have access to the coarse-graining level at which
such patterns generated by their own collective activity
are apparent. The relation between the relative perfor-
mance of the different types of agents and the nature of
information asymmetry is therefore crucially dependent
on the exact composition of the population to which they
belong. Our results imply that striving to acquire and
process ever increasing quantities of data in the hope of
making more accurate predictions in complex adaptive
systems, such as financial markets, may sometimes be
counter-productive. While concerns about the potential
pitfalls of “big data” have been voiced earlier [23], we
provide possibly the first rigorous demonstration using a
quantitative model of how such a failure can come about.
The insights gained from our study are quite general and
should apply to the broader context of strategic interac-
tions between a large number of adaptive agents.
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Figure S1: Average payoffs P1 , P2 of Type 1 and Type 2 agents (respectively) shown as a function of the memory length m1
of a single Type 1 agent interacting with N − 1 Type 2 agents with memory length m2 = 2 for different population sizes N.
Note that when the lone Type 1 agent does not have any relative advantage over the Type 2 agents. However, it still receives
its highest payoff when m1 = 2 (as in Fig. 2 for m2 = 1). Payoffs are averaged over 10
4 iterations in the steady state and over
100 different realizations.
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Figure S2: Average payoffs P1, P2 of Type 1 and Type 2 agents (respectively) shown as a function of the memory length m1 of
a population of N − 1 Type 1 agents interacting with a single Type 2 agent with memory length m2 = 1 for different values of
N . Note that the lone Type 2 agent enjoys a significant advantage over the rest of the population for low values of m1. The
trend of the payoff of the Type 2 agent as a function of m1 appears to mirror that of the Type 1 agents. Payoffs are averaged
over 104 iterations in the steady state and over 100 different realizations. A similar profile is seen when the memory length of
the Type 2 agents is m2 = 2.
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Figure S3: The average payoffs P1, P2 of Type 1 (shown in blue) and Type 2 agents (red) comprising a population of size
N (=255) for different population fractions f1 and memory length m1 of Type 1 agents. As Type 2 agents with sufficiently
large memory length (m2 > 2) effectively use random choice strategy [17], here the Type 2 agents are assumed to be randomly
choosing between the two possible options. The contours separate the regions in the (m1, f1) parameter space where Type
1 agents have a relative advantage over Type 2 agents and vice versa. The broken curve represents the optimal population
fraction f∗1 of Type 1 agents with a given memory length m1 at which they receive the highest payoff. The dotted curve is the
value of m1 at which Nf1 Type 1 agents are expected to have maximum payoff in absence of any Type 2 agents. Payoffs are
averaged over 104 iterations in the steady state and over 100 different realizations.
